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SELECTED UNITED STATES TAX ISSUES IN
CROSS-BORDER SECURITIZATIONS
WILLYS H. SCHNEIDER*
I.  INTRODUCTION
This Article discusses certain U.S. and related income tax issues
that arise in what are generally referred to as “cross-border securiti-
zations.”  The term “cross-border securitizations” covers securitiza-
tion transactions in which the obligors, originator, “special purpose
vehicle” (or “SPV”), and investors are in two or more jurisdictions.
For example, a transaction may involve a U.S. originator that holds
obligations of U.S. obligors and raises funds through a foreign SPV
from foreign investors.  Alternatively, the transaction might consist
of a non-U.S. originator that holds obligations of U.S. or non-U.S.
obligors and securitizes to foreign or U.S. investors.  A securitization
also might involve a guarantee or other credit enhancement from a
foreign party related to the issuer of debt securities.
Tax issues in cross-border securitizations include those arising in
purely domestic transactions, as well as certain foreign tax concerns.
Depending on the location of the originator, the receivables, and the
SPV, issues common to both U.S. and cross-border transactions (e.g.,
sale versus loan of receivables or entity-level tax on the SPV) may
have to be determined under foreign, in addition to or instead of,
U.S. law.1  This Article describes tax issues unique to cross-border
situations.
*Partner, Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler, LLP.
1. If a “financial asset securitization investment trust” (or “FASIT”) is used in a securiti-
zation transaction, the sale versus loan and entity-level tax issues do not arise under U.S. law.
A FASIT is a new and unique tax vehicle that is governed by a specific set of rules contained in
Sections 860H through 860L of the Internal Revenue Code (“I.R.C.”).  [Hereinafter, all Sec-
tion references are to the I.R.C.]  While U.S. rules on FASITs do not apply for purposes of
non-U.S. law, FASITs could be used in the United States to hold non-U.S. obligations or to
issue interests to foreign investors, subject to certain limitations.  See I.R.C. §§ 860K,
860L(a)(1)(C), and 860L(b)(1)(B).  Although FASITs came into effect September 1, 1997,
regulations that had been expected by that date and that are needed to clarify a number of
points in the statutory provisions have not yet been issued.  Accordingly, although at least one
FASIT transaction has been consummated, widespread use likely will await issuance of regula-
tions.
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II. WITHHOLDING TAX
A. General Rules
In a securitization transaction, payments treated as interest for
income tax purposes may be subject to U.S. or foreign withholding
taxes, whose cost must be factored into the transaction.  Withholding
taxes may arise in the following situations: (i) if there is a tax sale of
receivables with obligors in one country paying interest on the un-
derlying obligations to an SPV or investors in another country; (ii) if
a transaction between the originator in one country and an SPV or
ultimate investor in another country is treated as a tax loan to the
originator; or (iii) if an SPV in one country raises money by issuing
debt to holders in another country.
The United States and many other countries impose a with-
holding tax on the gross amount of interest paid to certain foreign
persons not otherwise engaged in business in the country from which
the interest is paid.  The U.S. withholding tax rate on interest is thirty
percent,2 subject to a statutory exemption for “portfolio interest.”3
The portfolio interest exemption applies to interest paid on regis-
tered obligations, and to bearer obligations that are targeted to non-
U.S. investors.4  Portfolio interest does not include interest received
by a bank on an extension of credit made pursuant to a loan agree-
ment entered into in the ordinary course of its trade or business,5 nor
does it include interest received by parties owning ten percent or
more of the interests in a debtor corporation or partnership.6  Portfo-
lio interest also does not refer to interest determined by reference to
(i) receipts, sales or other cash flow of the debtor or a related person;
(ii) any income or profits of the debtor or a related person; or (iii)
any dividend, partnership distributions or similar payments made by
the debtor or a related person (so called “contingent interest”).7  The
portfolio interest exemption thus applies only in certain securitiza-
tion transactions.  Accordingly, U.S. as well as non-U.S. withholding
tax remains a factor to be considered in structuring cross-border se-
curitizations.
2. See I.R.C. §§ 1441, 1442 (1994).
3. Id. §§ 871(h), 881(c).
4. See id. § 881(c)(3)(A).
5. See id.
6. See id. §§ 871(h)(3)(B), 881(c)(3)(B).
7. Id. §§ 871(h)(4), 881(c)(4).
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Any applicable withholding tax generally is withheld by a payor
on behalf of a payee and paid over to the appropriate taxing author-
ity.8  Frequently, this withholding tax is reduced or eliminated pursu-
ant to the terms of an income tax treaty between the countries of the
payee and the payor.9  In many instances, however, no treaty relief is
available.10  If the withholding tax is not eliminated, it is necessary to
determine which party will bear its cost.  In most cases, the borrower
will assume the withholding tax burden by means of a “gross-up”
provision under which the borrower pays the lender an extra amount
as compensation, on an after-tax basis, for the tax withheld.11
8. The U.S. Internal Revenue Service (the “IRS”) has recently issued new regulations
that simplify the responsibilities of U.S. withholding agents and the means of identifying enti-
tlement to exemptions from U.S. withholding tax.  The regulations do not substantively change
the incidence of such withholding tax with respect to securitization or other transactions.  See,
e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.1441-1(e) (as amended in 1997) (discussing withholding agent’s reliance on
beneficial owner withholding certificates, intermediary withholding certificates, qualified in-
termediary withholding certificates, and certain presumptions available to withholding agents
for purposes of treating a payee as foreign or domestic).  The new withholding regulations are
effective for payments made on and after January 1, 1999.
9. For example, income tax treaties between the United States and Germany, the United
States and the United Kingdom, and the United States and France eliminate withholding tax on
interest.  See Income Tax Convention, July 22, 1954, U.S.-F.R.G., art. 7, 5 U.S.T. 2768, 2784
[hereinafter U.S.-German Treaty]; Convention between the Government of the United States
and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for the
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on
Income and Capital Gains, Dec. 31, 1975, U.S.-U.K., art. 11, 31 U.S.T. 5668, 5680; Convention
Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the French
Republic for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Re-
spect to Taxes on Income and Capital, Aug. 31, 1994, U.S.-Fr., S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-32
(1995).  Treaties between the United States and Italy and the United States and Japan, on the
other hand, only limit the rate that can be imposed to 15% and 10%, respectively.  See Income
and Capital Tax Convention, Apr. 17, 1984, U.S.-Italy, art. 11, T.I.A.S. No. 11064; Convention
Between the United States of America and Japan for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and
the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, Mar. 8, 1971, U.S.-Japan,
art. 13, 23 U.S.T. 967, 990.
10. For example, although no tax treaties are in force between the United States and any
Latin American nation except Mexico, there is interest in negotiating with Brazil and Vene-
zuela and the United States has signed, but not ratified, a treaty with Argentina.  See Conven-
tion Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the
United Mexican States for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal
Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income, Sept. 18, 1992, U.S.-Mex., S. TREATY DOC. NO.
103-7 [hereinafter U.S.-Mexican Treaty]; see also Richard Mitchell, Note, United States-Brazil
Bilateral Income Tax Treaty Negotiations, 21 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 209, 209
(1997); Robert F. Hudson & Gregg D. Lemein, U.S. Tax Planning for U.S. Companies Doing
Business in Latin America, U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 233, 237 (1995-1996); S. EXEC. REP.
NO. 97-44, at 30 (1981).
11. See Willys H. Schneider,  Selected Tax Issues Affecting Domestic and Cross-Border
Securitizations Transactions, in TAX STRATEGIES FOR CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, DISPO-
SITIONS, SPIN-OFFS, JOINT VENTURES, FINANCINGS, REORGANIZATIONS AND RESTRUC-
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B. U.S. “Conduit” Regulations
In most securitization transactions, attempts are made to struc-
ture the deal to avoid withholding tax, an added cost that benefits
none of the parties involved.  For example, establishing an SPV in a
tax haven jurisdiction or in a jurisdiction with a beneficial tax treaty
network can help minimize withholding tax.  This is generally not dif-
ficult with respect to payments flowing out of a non-U.S. SPV resi-
dent in such a jurisdiction.  But where payments to the SPV originate
in the United States, “conduit” regulations provide an additional is-
sue to consider.12  Under these regulations, if tax avoidance consti-
tutes a principal purpose of a transaction, back-to-back loans and
other arrangements using an SPV in an intermediary jurisdiction (so-
called “financing arrangements”),13 can be recharacterized by ignor-
ing the SPV’s participation in the transaction, which results in in-
creased U.S. withholding tax.14
In particular, an SPV or other intermediate entity’s participation
in a transaction can be ignored under the conduit regulations: (i) if
such participation reduces the withholding tax that would have ap-
plied in the absence of such participation; (ii) if the intermediate en-
tity participates pursuant to a tax avoidance plan, i.e., a plan designed
in part to avoid withholding tax; and (iii) if either the intermediate
entity is related to the financing entity, or where no relation exists, if
the intermediate entity would not have participated in the financing
TURINGS 230 (Practising Law Institute ed. 1997)
12. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.881-3 (1995).  Only the IRS may use these rules, because
taxpayers are not permitted to disregard the form of their transactions.  See id. § 1.881-
3(a)(3)(iii).
13. See id. § 1.881-3(a)(2)(i) (defining “financing arrangement” as a series of transactions
by which one person (the “financing entity”) advances money or other property, or grants
rights to use property; and another person (the “financed entity”) receives money, other prop-
erty, or rights to use property, if the advance and receipt are effected through one or more in-
termediate entities and (except for certain cases involving two or more related persons), there
are “financing transactions” (including debt and certain equity as described in note 15 infra),
linking the three entities).
14. See id. § 1.881-3(b).  Tax avoidance will be deemed a principal purpose under the con-
duit regulations even if it is outweighed by other purposes, and regardless of whether the plan
is formal or informal, written or oral.  However, the plan must be in existence as of the date the
relevant transactions are entered into, and all relevant evidence is weighed in determining
whether there is a tax avoidance plan.  This evidence includes: (i) taking into account whether
the participation of the intermediate entity results in a significant reduction of tax; (ii) whether
the intermediate entity had sufficient funds valuable to make an advance without regard to any
advance to it; (iii) the time period between the steps in a transaction; and (iv) if the parties are
related, whether the financing transaction occurs in the ordinary course of integrated trade or
businesses conducted by such parties.  See id.
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arrangement on substantially the same terms but for the fact that the
financing entity engaged in the transaction with the intermediate en-
tity.  This latter scenario often is referred to as the “but for” test.15
Under the current version of these regulations, such recharacteriza-
tion may be avoided if the SPV is funded with certain types of equity.
However, in many securitization transactions, investors will hold in-
struments that, whether or not actually denominated as equity, con-
tain redemption rights or other similar features that will elicit their
treatment as part of a financing arrangement for purposes of the con-
duit regulations.16
The conduit regulations require consideration in the following
instance in which an intermediate entity or SPV is formed in a juris-
diction subject to a tax treaty with the United States that eliminates
withholding tax on interest (e.g., the United Kingdom).  Assume that
the SPV lends to a U.S. person (or acquires a pool of debt obligations
of U.S. obligors), and that the SPV is funded by investors, including
banks, that reside in another jurisdiction that either has no tax treaty
with the United States (e.g., Saudi Arabia) or has a tax treaty that re-
duces, but does not eliminate, the withholding tax (e.g., Italy).  Even
if this structure were primarily designed to achieve non-U.S. tax ad-
vantages, because a direct payment of interest from the U.S. bor-
rower to the foreign banks could be subject to U.S. withholding tax
(i.e., as noted above, the portfolio interest exemption may not apply
to banks), the transaction still could be subject to scrutiny under the
conduit regulations.17  Nonetheless, it may be possible to avoid the
impact of these regulations by demonstrating that the banks’ invest-
ment in the SPV does not constitute an extension of credit pursuant
to a loan agreement made in the ordinary course of its trade or busi-
ness.  The investors may be asked for representations to this effect in
15. See id. § 1.881-3(a)(4)(i).
16. See id. § 1.881-3(a)(2)(ii)(B).  Corporate stock or a similar interest in a partnership or
trust will be treated as a “financing transaction” that constitutes part of a “financing arrange-
ment”: (i) if the issuer is required to redeem the interest at a specified time, or if the holder has
the right to require such redemption or the making of a similar payment; (ii) if the issuer has
the right to redeem, and such redemption is, based on facts and circumstances as of the issue
date, more likely than not to occur; or (iii) if the owner of the interest has a put right involving
a person related to the issuer or acting pursuant to a plan or arrangement with the issuer.  See
id.
17. As noted above, the conduit regulations contain a rule stating that whether participa-
tion of the intermediate entity has resulted in a significant reduction of tax will be taken into
account in determining whether there is a tax avoidance plan, a finding necessary to trigger
application of the regulations.  See supra note 14.
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order to avoid imposition of penalties for failure to withhold.18
If there is a public offering of interests in the SPV to fund an
SPV’s loan to a U.S. obligor (or purchase of U.S. obligations), the
“but for” test contained in the regulations19 should prevent penalty
imposition.  In such an instance, one would argue that the fact that
some banks in non-treaty or unfavorable treaty jurisdictions may
purchase a portion of publicly offered investments is merely seren-
dipitous, and, therefore, that the SPV would have participated in the
transaction regardless of whether such investors had been involved.
If the facts preclude this argument, it may be advisable to restrict
sales of interests in the SPV to non-banks or banks in treaty jurisdic-
tions that eliminate the withholding tax.
With regard to non-bank investors, to the extent that a direct re-
ceipt of interest from the U.S. obligor would be eligible for the port-
folio interest exemption from withholding tax (i.e., that the amounts
in question constitute interest that qualifies for such exemption),
there would be no significant reduction in tax attributable to the
SPV’s participation, and the conduit regulations should not apply.
C.  Tax Treaty Limitation of Benefits Provisions
Distinct from the conduit regulations, the “limitation of bene-
fits” provisions contained in many tax treaties between the United
States and other countries may restrict the availability of reduced
treaty rates to recipients who do not maintain significant contacts
with the treaty jurisdiction in question.  For the past several years,
U.S. tax treaty policy has insisted on such provisions.  Although the
specific treaty provisions vary, their general thrust is to counteract so-
called “treaty shopping” by restricting benefits to entities that are ei-
ther publicly traded, engaged in significant business activities in their
home jurisdiction, or beneficially owned by residents of such jurisdic-
tion.20
18. See id. §§ 1.881-3(a)(3)(ii)(A), (D) (stating that recharacterization of transaction under
conduit regulations applies for purposes of liability for failure to withhold); Prop. Treas. Reg.
§§ 1.1441-7(d), 62 Fed. Reg. 53504 (1997) (discussing liability of withholding agents in conduit
financing arrangement situations); I.R.C. §§ 6651, 6721 (1994) (discussing penalties for failure
to withhold and to file related information returns).
19. See supra text accompanying note 15.
20. See, e.g., U.S.-German Treaty, supra note 9, at X art. 28 (stating that persons eligible
for treaty benefits include only resident individuals; the country itself (or a subdivision or local
authority thereof); a resident engaged in an active business in its resident country; a publicly
traded company; a company, more than 50% of which is owned by persons entitled to treaty
benefits and less than 50% of the gross income of which is used to meet liabilities of persons
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For example, under the facts assumed above, if the SPV were in
Ireland, whose recently ratified treaty with the United States includes
a limitation of benefits provision, there could, depending upon the
status of the intermediate entity, be a withholding tax issue without
regard to the conduit regulations.21  On the other hand, to the extent
that the portfolio interest exemption applied (i.e., assuming no re-
lated parties or contingent interest and no issues as to bank inves-
tors), there would be no withholding tax.
III.  TAXATION OF SPV AND ITS SHAREHOLDERS
A.  Taxation of SPV
As noted above, it may be desirable to locate an SPV involved in
a cross-border securitization in a tax haven jurisdiction.  Locating the
SPV in such a jurisdiction both minimizes withholding tax on any in-
terest payments made by the SPV and avoids mainstream tax on net
income of the SPV.  However, use of a tax haven also may increase
the potential withholding tax burden on any interest payments to be
made to the SPV because of the potential application of the conduit
regulations with respect to U.S.-source payments, and the fact that
tax havens typically are not parties to tax treaties that may reduce or
eliminate withholding tax.  Aside from the foregoing, it also is impor-
tant to ensure that the SPV will not be subject to any mainstream net
income tax in a jurisdiction other than that in which it is actually resi-
dent.
For example, if an SPV operating in one jurisdiction purchases a
pool of receivables from an originator, the obligors (which are in an-
not entitled to such benefits or a tax-exempt entity); U.S.-Mexican Treaty, supra note 10, at art.
17 (which is similar to the U.S.-German Treaty with additional special rules relating to entities
owned by any country that is a party to the North American Free Trade Agreement and to
qualification for reduced rates on dividends, interest and royalties); see also Convention for the
Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion, Dec. 18, 1992, U.S.-
Neth., S. TREATY DOC. NO. 6 (1993), art. 26 (having lengthy and heavily negotiated limitation
of benefits provisions, including rules similar to those described above but also special rules
aimed at eliminating the use of Holland as a jurisdiction to set up “conduit” entities with no
purpose other than avoiding withholding tax (i.e., effectively a precursor to conduit regula-
tions), and dealing with ownership by one or more European Community nation(s)).
21. Under the U.S.-Irish Treaty, if the intermediate entity were publicly traded, the limita-
tion of benefits article would not apply.  If not, its ownership by non-Irish persons could make it
ineligible for treaty benefits.  See Convention between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of Ireland for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Pre-
vention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital Gains, July 28, 1997,
U.S.-Ir., art. 23, S. Treaty Doc. No. 31, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997).
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other jurisdiction) and the originator, service the receivables in that
jurisdiction on behalf of the SPV.  A question thus arises as to
whether the SPV will be deemed to have a presence in that jurisdic-
tion, sufficient to subject it to mainstream income tax.  In the United
States a non-U.S. SPV that is deemed to be “doing business” in the
United States will, subject to a safe harbor for investments described
below, be subjected to net U.S. income tax on income related to such
business.22  Generally, this should not be a problem if the servicer is
performing purely ministerial functions, has no power to bind the
SPV in any way (e.g., by virtue of being able to agree to changes in
the terms of the receivables), and if the SPV is not otherwise man-
aged or controlled outside of its home jurisdiction.  In addition, most
income tax treaties contain provisions protecting a foreign entity
against net income tax unless the entity has a “permanent establish-
ment” in the jurisdiction in question.  Typically, a “permanent estab-
lishment” can be avoided if there is no office and are no employees in
such jurisdiction.23  As noted above, however, an SPV in a tax haven
will not be eligible for treaty relief.
In view of the fact that cross-border securitization transactions
frequently involve non-U.S. SPVs, it will be important to assure that
they not be subject to net income tax in the United States.  The
I.R.C. contains a safe harbor (hereinafter referred to as the
“investment safe harbor”) which can be critical to achieving this goal.
Under the investment safe harbor, a person will not be deemed en-
gaged in a U.S. trade or business (and, therefore, not subject to net
U.S. income tax)24 if its sole activities consist of effecting transactions
in stocks or securities for its own account.25
22. See I.R.C. § 882 (1994) (dictating foreign corporation engaged in business within the
United States be taxed as U.S. taxpayer on income effectively connected with the conduct of a
trade or business within the United States).
23. See, e.g., Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fis-
cal Evasion, Dec. 18, 1992, U.S.-Neth., art. 5, S. TREATY DOC. No. 6, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1993), 32 I.L.M. 462 (1993) [hereinafter U.S.-Netherlands Treaty]; U.S.-Sweden Income Tax
Treaty, art. 5, Sept. 1, 1994, Tax Treaties (CCH) ¶8801, Tax Treaties (WGL) ¶81,030
[hereinafter U.S.-Sweden Treaty]; Convention Between the United States of America and Ja-
pan for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect
to Taxes on Income, Mar. 8, 1971, art. 9, 23 U.S.T. 967 [hereinafter U.S.-Japan Treaty]
(permanent establishment includes a place of management, branch, office or factory or the
presence of dependent agents with authority, habitually exercised, to conclude contracts in
name of off-shore enterprise; limited use of facilities, e.g., display, storage, maintenance of
merchandise or for purchases of merchandise or collecting information, do not constitute a
permanent establishment).
24. See supra note 21.
25. See I.R.C. § 864(b)(2)(A)(ii).  Until this year it was necessary, in order to qualify un-
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If the SPV is buying many different obligations, including loans
and loan participations, over a period of time, as may be the case in
so-called “collateralized loan obligation” (or “CLO”) transactions,
concern arises as to whether the SPV is engaged in some sort of a fi-
nancing business that goes beyond the investment safe harbor just
described.  In such cases, and in the absence of any clear authority on
this issue, certain guidelines are generally observed to minimize the
risk of U.S. tax.26  These include, for example, restricting the SPV to
buying loans only in the secondary market, and not in initial offer-
ings; not permitting an investment advisor or other agent of the SPV
to negotiate the specific terms of loans in which participations by the
SPV are taken; restricting the extent to which an SPV can participate
in a refinancing of an existing loan; and/or making sure that the SPV
receives no amounts denominated as fees that could be construed as
having been received for performance of services, rather than as pure
compensation for use of money (e.g., an origination fee versus a fee
to induce a creditor to waive certain loan agreement covenants).27
Anticipated guidelines in the FASIT area may prove useful with
respect to these issues affecting non-U.S. SPVs.  In particular,
FASITs effectively are barred from the “origination” of loans by vir-
der this safe harbor, for the “principal office” of the offshore entity not to be in the United
States.  This could be achieved if certain enumerated functions, often referred to as the “ten
commandments,” were performed off-shore.  This requirement was repealed, effective January
1, 1998.
26. As indicated above, these and other guidelines have emerged in the absence of any
clear authority as to what constitutes the conduct of a financing business that would be deemed
to deprive a non-U.S. taxpayer of protection under the investment safe harbor.  A similar
problem exists in other contexts under the I.R.C.  See, e.g., Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.892-4T(c)(ii)
and (iii) (1988) (effecting transactions in stocks, securities or commodities for a foreign gov-
ernment’s own account does not constitute a “commercial activity” and a foreign government’s
income from such activities is thus exempt from U.S. income tax, but investments (including
loans) made by a “banking financing or similar business” do constitute commercial activities
yielding taxable income to a foreign government; no definition of “banking financing or similar
business”); I.R.C. § 7704(d)(2) (1994) (exception from corporate tax treatment for publicly
traded partnerships with significant passive income, including interest, does not apply to inter-
est derived in the conduct of a “financial or insurance business”; no definition of “financial or
insurance business”).  Cf. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.7704-3(b), 62 Fed. Reg. 66575 (1997)
(qualifying (passive) income does not include income derived in the ordinary course of a trade
or business and, for purposes thereof, income derived from an asset with respect to which the
partnership is a broker, market maker or dealer is treated as so derived, as opposed to income
derived from an asset with respect to which the taxpayer is a trader or investor).
27. The latter draws support from one aspect of the FASIT rules, i.e., that receipt of fees
or other compensation for services are effectively prohibited by virtue of triggering a 100 per-
cent tax thereon, whereas fees received as compensation for a “waiver, amendment or consent”
under debt obligations held by the FASIT are not subject to this tax.  See I.R.C. §
860L(e)(2)(D) (1994); see also text accompanying note 27 infra.
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tue of the fact that any net income derived from such activity is sub-
ject to a one hundred percent tax.28  The term “origination” appears
nowhere else in the I.R.C.  It is conceivable that upcoming FASIT
regulations will contain some definition of the term or other guidance
that could be looked to, by analogy, in determining what actions an
SPV could take with respect to U.S. loan transactions before it is
treated as engaged in a U.S. trade or business for purposes of the
rules described above.
Another factor to take into account are potential U.S. state and
local income taxes.  Many states, for example, do not contain an in-
vestment safe harbor against imposition of their income tax.  Thus,
care always must be taken to avoid a presence in a particular state.29
B.  Taxation of SPV Shareholders
If the SPV is a foreign corporation owned by U.S. shareholders,
one also must take account of certain so-called “anti-avoidance” pro-
visions of the I.R.C.  These include the Sub-part F rules on
28. See I.R.C. § 860L(e)(2)(C) (1994).
29. The State of New York, for example, does not at this point allow an investment safe
harbor.  The only similar rule that exists for New York purposes is relevant to foreign corpora-
tions that may be partners in a “portfolio investment partnership,” defined as a limited partner-
ship, that is not a securities dealer (as defined in Section 1236) and at least 90 percent of the
gross income of which is derived from dividends, interest, payments with respect to securities
loans, and gains for the sale or other disposition of stock or securities or foreign currencies, or
other income derived with respect to its business of investing in such stock, securities or curren-
cies.  See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 20, § 1-3.2(a)(6)(iii)(d) (1997); 19 R.C.N.Y. § 11-
06(d) (1997); I.R.C. § 851(b)(2) (1994).  Such partners are exempt from the general rule that
would otherwise subject a foreign corporation to the New York corporate franchise tax if it is a
partner in a partnership doing business or employing capital in New York.  Unless that rule is
applicable, therefore, it is critical, at a minimum, that a non-New York corporation not employ
capital, own or lease property, or maintain an office in New York in order to avoid New York
state and city income tax.  See N.Y. TAX LAW § 209(1) (McKinney 1997); N.Y. COMP. CODES
R. & REGS. tit. 20, § 1-3.2(a) (1997); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 11-603(1) (1997); 19 R.C.N.Y. §
11-03 (1997).  Such tax can also apply, however, if the corporation is otherwise deemed to be
“doing business” in New York, a somewhat ill-defined term.  See N.Y. TAX LAW § 209 (1997);
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 20, § 1-3.2(a)(1)(i) and § 1-3.2(b) (1997); N.Y.C. Admin.
Code § 11-603(1) (1997); 19 R.C.N.Y. § 11-03(a)(1)(i) and § 11-03(b) (1997).  Maintaining New
York bank accounts, hiring a broker to perform acts incidental to the safekeeping of such ac-
counts, having non-employee directors with New York offices or keeping books and records on
New York, if such books and records are not kept by employees, should not be problematical.
See N.Y. TAX LAW § 209(2) (McKinney 1997); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 20, § 1-3.3
(1997); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 11-603(2) (1997); 19 R.C.N.Y. § 11-04(c) (1997).  However, the
fewer functions that are performed in New York the better.  In particular, it is advisable not to
hold corporate meetings in New York, or to permit officers or other employees to take actions
there that bind the corporation. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 20, § 1-3.2(f) ex. 1
(1997); 19 R.C.N.Y. § 11-03(f) ex. 1 (1997).
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“controlled foreign corporations” (or “CFCs”), i.e., foreign corpora-
tions over fifty percent of the vote or value of which are held by ten
percent or more U.S. shareholders, and the “passive foreign invest-
ment company” (or “PFIC”) rules.30  Significantly, these rules can
apply either to actual equity owners or to owners of subordinated
debt that is or may be characterized as equity for U.S. income tax
purposes.31
Under the Subpart F rules,32 certain earnings (including, inter
alia, interest, dividends and gains from sales of securities) of a CFC
may be treated as taxable to U.S. shareholders who own ten percent
or more of the CFC even if such earnings are not actually distributed.
In addition, if a CFC’s assets are pledged to secure a U.S. share-
holder’s debt, or such debt is guaranteed by the CFC or at least two-
thirds of the CFC’s voting stock is used to secure the debt and the
stock pledge is accompanied by one or more negative covenants or
similar restrictions, deemed dividends may result.33  Thus, for exam-
ple, if an SPV is a CFC and buys receivables from a related U.S.
originator in a tax loan transaction, deemed income can be triggered
to ten percent or more U.S. shareholders of the SPV even if no cash
is actually received by them.
Under the PFIC rules, any U.S. shareholder of a foreign SPV
that is a PFIC (i.e., that primarily has passive income) may, whether
or not the U.S. shareholders are in control of the SPV, be liable for
an interest charge on the tax on dividend distributions from the SPV
30. Under a recently enacted rule, a PFIC that is also a CFC will, with respect to periods
after December 31, 1997, not be treated as a PFIC with respect to 10 percent shareholders who
are subject to the Subpart F rules, as described above.  See I.R.C. § 1297(e) (1994).  In addition,
under the foreign personal holding company rules, passive income of a closely held foreign
SPV can be imputed to U.S. shareholders.  This arises only, however, if the SPV is controlled,
directly or indirectly, by five or fewer U.S. individuals and, therefore, will be irrelevant in most
securitization transactions.  See id. §§ 551-558.
31. There is no bright-line test that applies in determining whether an instrument is prop-
erly viewed as debt or equity for U.S. income tax purposes.  The authority that does exist gen-
erally relies on a number of factors, including, inter alia, whether there is a definite maturity
date and, if so, the length of the term of the instrument; whether there is a market rate of inter-
est, payable on fixed dates; the security for the obligation; whether the issuer is thinly capital-
ized; identity of interest between creditors and equity owners; and the form of the transaction
and the intent of the parties.  See, e.g., John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 521 (1946)
(explaining that debt/equity inquiry depends on particular factors, no one of which is exclu-
sive).  In certain securitization transactions interests in a thinly capitalized SPV that are de-
nominated as indebtedness but are, for example, deeply subordinated to other debt, may be
treated as equity, as opposed to debt, under U.S. principles.  A more detailed discussion of this
issue is beyond the scope of this Article.
32. See I.R.C. §§ 951-64 (1994).
33. See id. at § 956(d); Treas. Reg. § 1.956-2(c) (as amended in 1988).
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that are attributable to earnings accumulated in the prior year and,
therefore, with respect to which U.S. tax has been deferred.34  In addi-
tion, gains on sales of PFIC stock are susceptible to being taxed as
ordinary income rather than capital gain, to the extent attributable to
accumulated earnings, and tax on such gain also can be subject to the
interest charge just described.35
The interest charges and ordinary income treatment of sale gain
can be avoided if a so-called “qualifying electing fund” or “QEF”
election is made to recognize taxable income, with respect to a U.S.
shareholder’s share of the earnings of the SPV, on a current basis, i.e.,
even in the absence of distributions.36  Alternatively, the interest
charge and ordinary income treatment of sale gain generally can be
avoided if, in the case of  “marketable” PFIC stock, an election is
made to mark the stock to market on an annual basis and take into
account as ordinary income any appreciation in the value thereof.37
In a transaction in which distributions will be made by a PFIC on
a current basis, a QEF election makes sense.  In such case there also
is a further election that can be made whereby, if the SPV/PFIC does
not distribute all of its earnings in a taxable year, payment of some or
all of the taxes on the SPV’s income can be deferred, subject to an in-
terest charge on the deferred amount.38  This would be advisable, for
example, where debt instruments owed by the SPV carry “original is-
sue discount” (“OID”), requiring income accrual in the absence of
cash (so-called “phantom income”).
IV.  “EARNINGS STRIPPING”
Under the so-called “earnings stripping” rules of Section 163(j)
of the I.R.C., a U.S. corporate borrower may be limited as to the ex-
tent to which it can claim deductions, on a current basis, for interest
expense.  Interest expense subject to potential limitation under these
provisions includes debt owed to related persons who are wholly or
partially exempt from U.S. federal income tax (including, in particu-
34. See id. §§ 1291-1297.
35. See id. § 1291(a).
36. See id. §§ 1291(d)(i), 1293.
37. See id. §§ 1291(d)(1), 1296.  “Marketable stock” is defined for this purpose as stock
regularly traded on a national securities exchange or national market system or any exchange
or other market which is determined to have rules adequate to carry out the purposes of the
mark-to-market provisions; foreign stock, to the extent provided in regulations; and, to the ex-
tent provided in regulations, any option on stock of the type described above.  Special rules
also apply in the case of certain “regulated investment companies.” See id. § 1296(e).
38. See id. § 1294.
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lar, related non-U.S. entities exempt from withholding tax under an
applicable tax treaty),39 or debt guaranteed (whether via a formal
guarantee or “comfort letter” or other arrangement)40 by such per-
son.41  The “earnings stripping” provisions apply if the corporation
has a debt-to-equity ratio in excess of 1.5 to 1 and if its interest ex-
pense in a given taxable year exceeds a prescribed threshold.42
The earnings stripping rules should apply in securitization trans-
actions only to the extent that the transfer of receivables is viewed as
a loan, as opposed to a sale, for tax purposes, since in a sale transac-
tion there is no interest expense (although there may be a loss on the
sale of receivables).  To date, there is no provision treating such a
loss as interest for purposes of the “earnings stripping” provisions.
Proposed regulations have reserved this issue.43  Note, however, that
if a sale of receivables is made to a purchaser that is related to the
seller, i.e., if there is over fifty percent common ownership, a loss on
the sale would be disallowed under Section 267(a).
If a securitization transaction does involve a tax loan, the earn-
ings stripping rules could apply if, for example, the loan is guaranteed
by a foreign parent of the originator/borrower.  Only guarantees of
39. Interest that is subject to U.S. withholding tax at a reduced treaty rate is treated for
this purpose as not subject to U.S. tax to the extent of the proportion of the U.S. withholding
tax rate under the applicable treaty to the statutory withholding tax rate.  See id. § 163(j)(5)(B).
For example, if the U.S. statutory withholding tax rate is 30 percent and the applicable treaty
rate is 15 percent (as in the case of payments to an Italian investor), one-half of the interest
paid or accrued to a resident of the treaty country will be considered as not subject to U.S. fed-
eral income tax.
40. See also note 43 infra.
41. The provisions with respect to guaranteed debt do not apply, (i) to the extent provided
in regulations, if the guarantor would have been subject to tax, on a net income basis, had in-
terest been paid to it; or (ii) if the borrowing taxpayer owns at least 8 percent of the guarantor.
A loan guaranteed by a foreign affiliate subject to a full U.S. withholding tax (as opposed to a
net income tax) could, however, be subject to the earnings stripping rules.  In this connection,
note that the portfolio interest exemption does not apply to loans by affiliated entities.  See su-
pra text accompanying note 6.
42. See I.R.C. § 163(j)(2) (1994).  Specifically, current interest deductions will be denied if
the corporation’s net interest expense in a given year exceeds 50 percent of its “adjusted tax-
able income” (taxable income computed with certain adjustments, including ignoring net inter-
est expense, any net operating loss deduction, or any depreciation, amortization or depletion
deduction) for such year.  Disallowed interest expense may be carried forward and deducted in
the taxable year in which the corporation has net interest expense in an amount less than 50
percent of its adjusted taxable income.
43. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.163(j)-2(e)(3), 56 Fed. Reg. 27907 (1991); cf. Temp. Treas.
Reg. § 1.861-9T(b)(3) (1988) (treating losses on sale of certain receivables treated as equivalent
to interest expenses for purposes of source of income rules).  The latter provision limited the
ability to use securitizations to maximize utilization of foreign tax credits by multi-national cor-
porations by maximizing foreign source income.
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underlying credit risk with respect to transferred receivables, how-
ever, as opposed to guarantees of performance, or warranties as to
the nature and quality of receivables, presumably should trigger ap-
plication of the earnings stripping rules in such case.44
V.  OTHER ISSUES
Other U.S. tax issues that may arise in cross-border securitiza-
tions include: i) generation of currency gains or losses under I.R.C.
Section 988 (to the extent, for example, that a U.S. party to a transac-
tion is entitled to receive (or required to pay) amounts in currency
other than U.S. dollars);45 ii) potential withholding tax on swap pay-
ments where swaps are entered into to hedge interest rate risk; or iii)
potential transfer price adjustments under Section 482, where sales or
other transfers take place between affiliated parties in different juris-
dictions.
A.  Currency Gains and Losses
Currency gains or losses arise where a taxpayer or a “qualified
business unit”46 either engages in one of four specified transactions47
that are denominated in a currency other than the taxpayer’s
“functional”48 currency (“nonfunctional currency”), or disposes of a
44. The legislative history of section 163(j) indicates that a guarantee for this purpose in-
cludes any arrangement under which a person directly or indirectly assures, on a conditional or
unconditional basis, the payment of another’s obligation under any indebtedness.  See H.R.
Rep. No. 103-111, at 686 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 378, 917.  A guarantee of per-
formance by the parties, which does not ensure payment on the underlying receivables, should,
therefore, not trigger an earnings stripping issue.
45. Section 988 prescribes special, detailed, rules with respect to the federal income tax
treatment of exchange gains or losses from transactions denominated in a currency other than
the taxpayer’s “functional” currency, i.e., other than the U.S. dollar or other currency in which
the taxpayer’s books and records are kept.
46. A “qualified business unit” is defined as any separate and clearly identified unit of a
trade or business of a taxpayer that maintains separate books and records.  See I.R.C. § 989(a)
(1994).
47. These transactions are: (i) the acquisition of a debt instrument; (ii) becoming an obli-
gor under a debt instrument; (iii) accruing (or otherwise taking into account) any item of ex-
pense or gross income or receipts which is to be paid or received after the date on which so ac-
crued or taken into account; and (iv) entering into, or acquiring any forward contract, futures
contract, option or similar financial instrument.  See I.R.C. § 988(c) (1994).  Thus lenders or
borrowers in securitizations where multiple currencies are involved can be affected by the rules
of Section 988.
48. Under Section 985, a taxpayer’s “functional” currency is the U.S. dollar, or, in the case
of a qualified business unit, the currency of the economic environment in which a significant
part of that unit’s activities are conducted and which is used by that unit in keeping its books
and records.  See I.R.C. § 985 (1994).
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nonfunctional currency (a “Section 988 transaction”).  A currency
gain or loss from a Section 988 transaction is equal to that portion of
the gain or loss realized on such transaction by reason of a change in
exchange rates on or after the booking date (i.e., the date on which
payment is made or received).  Section 988 prescribes certain timing,
character and source consequences for currency gains or losses asso-
ciated with a Section 988 transaction, which are applied separately to
each Section 988 transaction of a taxpayer.  Generally, with respect to
currency gains or losses, Section 988 applies the general realization
and recognition provisions of the I.R.C., characterizes such gains or
losses as ordinary income or loss, and sources such gains and losses
by reference to the taxpayer or qualified business unit’s residence.
With respect to Section 988 transactions that are part of a hedging
transaction that qualifies for “integrated” treatment under the appli-
cable regulations, however, the above rules do not apply separately
to each Section 988 transaction.  Instead such transactions are treated
as a single instrument for all purposes (including characterization and
sourcing of gains or losses derived).49
B.  Swap Payments
U.S. regulations provide that swap payments (including currency
swaps) to foreign counterparties not engaged in a U.S. trade or busi-
ness do not generally constitute U.S. source income, and thus, gener-
ally are not subject to U.S. withholding tax.50  However, non-periodic
payments made to U.S. counterparties pursuant to a swap agreement
may, if treated as loans, give rise to U.S. source interest income.  In
particular, a “significant” non-periodic payment may be treated as a
loan to the U.S. counterparty and the time value component associ-
ated with such loan must be recognized as U.S. source interest for all
49. See Treas. Reg. § 1.988-5, which provides integrated treatment for three categories of
hedging transactions: (i) hedging transactions associated with debt instruments; (ii) hedging
transactions which involve executory contracts to pay nonfunctional currency in the future with
respect to ordinary course purchases or the performance of services; and (iii) hedging transac-
tions which are intended to reduce the risk of currency fluctuations between the trade and set-
tlement dates with respect to the purchase or sale of publicly traded stock or securities by a
cash basis taxpayer.
50. See Treas. Regs. §§ 1.863-7(b) (as amended in 1991); 1.1441-4(a)(3) (as amended in
1997); I.R.C. § 988(a)(3) (1994); Treas. Reg. § 1.988-4 (as amended in 1992).  However, cur-
rency swap payments integrated with a debt investment pursuant to Treas. Reg. § 1.988-5 could
constitute U.S. source income (and thus would be subject to U.S. withholding tax) if payments
on the underlying debt instrument constitute U.S. source income.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.988-5 (as
amended in 1997).
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purposes of the I.R.C.51  Although what is “significant” for these pur-
poses is not specifically defined, an example in the applicable regula-
tions provides that a non-periodic payment is significant if it exceeds
forty percent of the present value of the fixed payments under the
swap agreement.52  Thus, if a swap agreement provides for a non-
periodic payment and a foreign counterparty making the payment
(which is treated as a loan) cannot claim the benefits of the portfolio
interest exemption or an applicable income tax treaty, the U.S.
source interest income deemed to arise with respect to the significant
non-periodic payment could be subject to U.S. withholding tax.
C.  Transfer Pricing
Transfer pricing issues could arise, for example, if there are mul-
tiple SPV’s in different jurisdictions, or if receivables being sold arise
from sales between U.S. and non-U.S. affiliates.  In certain cases, this
can result in imputation of additional income (or disallowance of a
deduction) to a U.S. taxpayer.53
VI.  CONCLUSION
This Article has demonstrated some of the important and unique
tax issues which develop from the intersection of cross-border securi-
tizations with various tax jurisdictions.  Given the complex nature of
the transactions and the potential for innovation in the field, changes
inevitably will occur in the regulations and enforcement patterns of
various tax jurisdictions.  However, the analyses outlined here for the
various types of issues ought to remain useful tools for understanding
and dealing with tax issues unique to cross-border securitizations.
51. See Treas. Reg. § 1.446-3(g)(4) (as amended in 1994).
52. See id. at § 1.446-3(g)(6), Ex. 3.
53. Significant penalties can be imposed, under Section 6662 of the Code, if inter-company
pricing adjustments proposed by the IRS are upheld.
